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A standard, often implicit, assumption in economics is that 
people only accumulate wealth to fund consumption by 
themselves and their families. In this article, we will argue 
that, in many circumstances, people have other motiva-
tions for wealth acquisition. In particular, we will argue 
that people acquire wealth in order to be wealthier than 
other people. Moreover, while this desire to be wealthier 
than other people appears to capture a concern for relative 
status, it can be justified on narrow economic grounds. 
This desire to be relatively wealthy is similar to the so-
cial motivations for wealth acquisition mentioned by a 
number of prominent early economists. Broadly speaking, 
they argued that society views wealthy individuals posi-
tively and, furthermore, that this positive light serves as an 
important motivation for the acquisition of wealth.
1 Adam 
Smith (1759, pp. 108-10) wrote 
For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? 
what is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of 
wealth, of power, and preheminence [sic]? Is it to supply the 
necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer can 
supply them .... From whence, then, arises that emulation 
which runs through all the different ranks of men, and what 
are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose 
of human life which we call bettering our condition? To be 
observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sym-
pathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages 
which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not 
the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is 
always founded upon the belief of our being the object of 
attention and approbation. 
Veblen (1899) argued that there developed within soci-
eties a belief about the level of conspicuous consumption 
that is appropriate to a particular rank within a society, 
that this consumption level increases with one's rank, and, 
further, that as the society becomes richer, the appropriate 
level for any given rank rises. Veblen also argued that 
since the primary purpose of these conspicuous consump-
tions is to signal one's success, they must be of a publicly 
observable nature or at least produce a publicly observable 
product. 
The pervasive assumption in current economic models 
that people are not concerned with relative wealth stems 
not from a belief in its descriptive accuracy, but rather 
from methodological considerations. Economics has been 
successful as a discipline because of the restrictions im-
posed by the assumptions of the models employed. A 
model can have predictive power only to the extent that 
some kinds of behavior are inconsistent with the as-
sumptions of that model. Foremost among the assump-
tions that underlie economic models is that agents are ra-
tional: agents choose from the actions available that ac-
tion which yields the highest utility. The assumption that 
agents maximize utility, however, puts no restrictions on 
*The authors would like to thank V. V. Chari, Tom Holmes, Ed Prescott, Richard 
Rogerson, Andres Velasco, and Randall Wright for their helpful comments. Postlewaite 
thanks the National Science Foundation for support. 
'This view was, of course, not one espoused by economists alone. See, for exam-
ple, Weber 1958. 
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behavior in the absence of restrictions on the nature of the 
utility function. Any observed pattern of behavior can be 
rationalized as utility-maximizing if utility functions can 
change arbitrarily through time. The force of the rational-
agent assumption in economic models comes from the 
concurrent restrictions on the utility function, for example, 
the requirement that the utility function be either unchang-
ing through time or changing in a well-defined way. Simi-
larly, economists can assume that many variables affect 
individuals, but only at the cost of weakening the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from the analysis. Typically, econ-
omists have restricted agents' utility functions to depend 
only on consumption for this reason: allowing agents' de-
cisions to be affected by such things as feelings of compe-
tition, envy, or rivalry admits models that have no predic-
tive power.
2 
We are interested in developing models that accommo-
date a concern for relative wealth in reduced-form models 
while maintaining the standard economic assumption that 
individuals ultimately care only about consumption. In 
these models, an agent's concern for relative wealth is in-
strumental: he or she cares about relative wealth only be-
cause final consumption is related not just to wealth, but 
additionally to relative wealth. In Cole, Mailath, and 
Postlewaite 1992, we presented a model in which agents 
care about relative wealth because relative wealth affects 
mating. That model deals with an environment in which 
there is a succession of generations of men and women 
who match and jointly make a consumption/saving deci-
sion. The members of each sex differ only in their en-
dowments. An immediate consequence of the assumption 
that consumption is joint is that each individual prefers to 
be matched with the richest member of the opposite sex, 
all other things being equal. If the matching in a particu-
lar period has no effect on how future generations will 
match, voluntary matching will be positively assortative 
on wealth; that is, the wealthiest men will match with the 
wealthiest women, and so on.
3 When matching is posi-
tively assortative on wealth, individuals who are higher 
in the wealth distribution for their sex will end up with 
better matches (that is, richer mates). Thus individuals 
care about relative wealth, but in the instrumental way 
described above: they care about relative wealth because 
it leads to wealthier mates, which results in higher con-
sumption.
4 
The purpose of the current article is twofold. First, we 
provide a simple exposition of the basic ideas contained 
in our earlier work and discuss in more depth the inter-
action between relative standing and economic behavior. 
Second, we apply these ideas to two economic problems 
of independent interest. We first develop an effort model 
with complete information and show how the concern 
about relative wealth affects individuals' effort decisions. 
We then develop a second model which extends the anal-
ysis to include private information about income, which 
induces signaling that can be interpreted as conspicuous 
consumption. 
We should emphasize that the direct implications of 
these models in which agents care about relative wealth 
do not necessarily differ from those that would obtain if 
relative wealth were put directly into the utility function. 
There are, however, advantages to our approach. First, an 
agent's concern for relative wealth in reduced-form prefer-
ences is induced by the fundamentals of the environment. 
Changes in the fundamentals of that environment will lead 
to predictable changes in reduced-form preferences. Here, 
unlike the case in which relative wealth is put directly into 
the utility function, testable implications can be derived 
about the relationship between fundamentals and reduced-
form preferences. The dependence of reduced-form pref-
erences on the fundamentals provides for additional scope 
in explaining why seemingly similar agents behave differ-
ently. 
An Effort Model With Complete Information 
Consider a one-period model in which there are two types 
of agents, men and women. There exist a continuum of 
men indexed by i e [0,1] and a continuum of women in-
dexed by j e [0,1]. Male i is exogenously endowed with 
i units of good x, while female j can produce good y by 
2A few modern economists have sought to explore the implications of including 
status concerns in preferences in formal economic models. They include Duesenberry 
(1949), Frank (1985), Abel (1990), Robson (1992), Bakshi and Chen (1994), Campbell 
and Cochrane (1994), and Zou (1994). However, none of their models seek to explain 
why agents might have a concern for status. 
3The main point of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 1992 is to demonstrate that this 
is not the only possibility. There may be a social norm that prescribes a particular 
matching rule that is not necessarily positively assortative on wealth and, further, that 
it is in the self-interest of all individuals to follow the norm's prescriptions. In this way, 
there may naturally be multiple equilibria that provide agents with different incentives 
to save and invest. 
4Of course, if individuals' decision problems were described in sufficiently rich 
detail, relative wealth wouldn't matter. For example, we might imagine treating the 
matching decision as a market transaction, with prices given for mates with particular 
characteristics. If all the decisions about which individuals care are determined through 
markets, then, obviously, prices and an individual's income completely determine that 
individual's utility. Hence the instrumental interest in relative wealth is linked to the ab-
sence of some relevant markets. We discuss this issue further in our concluding com-
ments at the end of this article. 
13 expending effort. There is no trade; each agent seeks to 
match with an agent of the opposite sex in order to con-
sume both goods. By assumption, both goods are jointly 
consumed by two matched individuals.
5 
All agents have identical utility functions over the joint 
consumption of a matched pair's bundle given by u(y) + 
x. We assume that the female agent has a disutility for ef-
fort given by -v(/), where / denotes labor effort. Female 
output of good j is given by a(j)l, where the productivity 
function a(j) gives female / s productivity per unit of ef-
fort. We allow the productivity levels, denoted by a(J)9 to 
differ across females. We assume that the females are 
ordered so that a(J) is increasing in j, the index or names 
of the females. 
Matching is voluntary and, in this section, based on 
complete information. A given matching is voluntary if no 
two unmatched agents mutually strictly prefer each other 
to their current matches. Since all consumption is joint by 
assumption, agents desire to be matched with as wealthy 
a mate as possible. Consequently, in any voluntary match-
ing, the wealthiest male will match with the wealthiest fe-
male and, more generally, the /cth-percentile male in the 
wealth distribution of men will be matched with the kth-
percentile woman in the female wealth distribution. Since 
the distribution of good x is fixed exogenously, women's 
effort decisions determine the matching of men and wom-
en, along with the consumption levels in the matches. In 
equilibrium, each female takes as given other women's ef-
fort decisions, and hence the endowment level of her equi-
librium match is given by her rank in the distribution of y. 
For a particular choice of outputs by women, we sum-
marize the relationship between an individual female's 
output and her mate's endowment by the matching func-
tion m(y), which indicates the endowment of the man who 
will match with a woman with wealth y. If female j pro-
duces j units of output, while half of the other females 
produce less than y and half more, then female j will be 
matched with the male with the median endowment, or an 
endowment of one-half. If female /s output is such that 
exactly three-quarters of the females produce less than 
she, then she will be matched in equilibrium with the male 
whose endowment is three-quarters. In other words, m is 
the distribution function of female output. If female output 
(wealth) is strictly increasing in j, then the matching func-
tion is simply the inverse of the output function: if female 
j produces v = y(j) units of output, then the index (and so 
endowment) of her mate is given by m{y) - y~\y(j)) = j. 
Given a matching function ra(-), female /s optimal ef-
fort level will be the solution to the following problem: 
(1) max, u(a(j)l) - v(/) + m(a(j)l). 
A female's total utility is determined by her direct utility 
from consumption of her own output, her disutility from 
effort, and the utility she derives from consuming her 
mate's endowment of x It is not difficult to establish that 
in equilibrium a female's output level is increasing in her 
productivity. We establish this result in Proposition 1 in 
the Appendix. 
The first-order condition which, under certain condi-
tions,
6 characterizes the solution to the problem (1) is 
(2) a{j)[u\a{j)l) + m'(aU)D] - v'(/) = 0. 
We denote the value of effort / that solves (1) by /(/). The 
first-order condition indicates how the impact of the equi-
librium match quality affects a woman's effort decision. 
The concern about her relative output level induced by the 
tournament for males, reflected by m in the first-order 
condition, leads to an increase in the effort level. When m 
is relatively large, there is an incentive to work harder 
since the resulting increase in output has a greater impact 
on the quality of the resulting match. Since m(y) is the 
fraction of females whose output level is below yf if the 
distribution of females' output is tight, m is large; that is, 
a small change in an individual female's output can have 
a large effect on her rank; conversely, if females' outputs 
are disperse, the opposite is true.
7 
A female is concerned about her output rank only to 
the extent that males differ in the levels of the male good. 
If male / s endowment level was given by yj, then, if the 
effort levels of the other females are held fixed, the new 
matching function would be given by ym(a(j)l(j)), and the 
impact on female /s effort decision would be larger or 
smaller as y was greater or less than one. Note that in the 
5We assume that only females can produce good y for tractability; for this case, 
the wealth distribution for only one sex needs to be endogenously determined. Similar 
considerations motivate our assumption that there are distinct goods x and y that cannot 
be traded. The assumption that all consumption within a matched pair is joint avoids 
distributional considerations between the two people. Models incorporating distribu-
tional considerations are analyzed in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 1995. 
6The first-order condition characterizes any interior solution to (1) if the payoff 
function is differentiable. Such a solution exists if, for example, u{0) > 0, v'(0) = 0, u 
is increasing and bounded, and v is strictly convex. 
7Since the equilibrium matching function is just the inverse of the wealth distribu-
tion, ra'(c) is just the inverse of the slope of the female wealth distribution at c. 
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extreme case where y = 0, matching would be irrelevant 
from the females' perspective, and they would choose 
their effort levels so that a{j)u\a{j)l) - v\l) = 0.
8 
An equilibrium, then, is an effort function /: [0,1] —> M+ 
and a matching function m: M+ —> [0,1] such that 




A Closed-Form Example 
Suppose that u(y) = y, v(/) = /
2, and a(j) = a(2j)
m. We 
will show that the equilibrium matching function is given 
by m(y) = gy, where g solves 
(5) 2(1+2) = 1/a
2. 
If we assume that the equilibrium matching function is 
given by gy female /s problem is given by 
(6) max, a(j)l + ga(j)l - I
2 
which implies that 
(7) l{j) = a(j)(\+g)/2. 
In order to verily that the conjectured matching func-
tion is an equilibrium, we need to show that m(y(j)) = j, 
that is, that the yth-percentile female is being matched 
with the yth-percentile male in equilibrium. Using the con-
jectured form for g, and substituting for y(j) and a(j), 
yields 
(8) m(y(j)) = g(l+g)a
2j=j. 
It follows that our conjectured matching rule and labor ef-
fort decisions constitute an equilibrium. 
Making use of equations (5) and (7), we can derive the 
following expression for the impact of a change in a, 
which can be interpreted as a proportionate change in pro-
ductivities: 
(9) dl(j)/da = (\+g)(2j)





The two terms in the above expression for the change in 
female / s effort level correspond to the effects of the 
change in her wage alone, with the matching function 
held fixed and the effects of the change in the equilibrium 
matching function induced by the change in a. This 
example makes clear that female j would respond differ-
ently to a proportionate change in her own productivity 
than to a proportionate change in all the females' produc-
tivity. The first term is positive, demonstrating that in-
creases in her own productivity increase a female's effort, 
while the second term is negative, indicating that when all 
females' productivities increase, the resulting change in 
the matching function diminishes each female's effort 
choice. The intuition behind the second effect is straight-
forward: when all females' productivities go up, the direct 
effect—if we ignore matching concerns—is to increase fe-
males' labor supplies. As a result, the wealth distribution 
becomes more dispersed, lowering the marginal value of 
an increase in wealth on matching. This lower marginal 
benefit negatively impacts females' effort decisions.
1
0 
It can also be seen from this example that it is competi-
tion from below that distorts individuals' effort decisions. 
If both the set of females and the set of males were trun-
cated, by removing the males and females whose index is 
greater than one-half, the behavior of the remaining indi-
viduals would be unchanged. This follows from footnote 
8. The female with least productivity has zero productivity 
and so chooses / = 0. This would not be affected by the 
removal of the upper-index individuals. However, truncat-
ing from the bottom would create a new lowest-productiv-
ity female who cannot be distorted. This is intuitive, since 
any female agent who is distorting her effort level upward 
is only doing so in order to avoid falling below the output 
level of the females just below her. 
Finally, if we assumed that there were different soci-
eties, the members of which only mated with members of 
8There is one qualification to this discussion when considering the female at the 
bottom of the ability distribution. For the lowest-ability female there is no reason to dis-
tort upward her effort level in response to matching considerations since in equilibrium 
she is already getting the worst quality mate. This implies that her effort level must be 
her optimal choice absent any matching considerations; that is, 1(0) will satisfy the 
equation a(0)u(a(0)l) - v'(/) = 0. For this to be optimal it must be the case that 
m(a(0)l(0)) = 0. Note that since female 0 is undistorted, the first-order cost of distorting 
upward her effort level is zero, which implies that the effort levels will rise very steeply 
in a neighborhood of j = 0 if a(0) * 0. 
9The equilibrium female output function c is the unique solution to the restricted 
initial value problem c\j) = [v\c(j)/a(j)) - a(j)u'(c(j))]~\ 0 < dc(j)/dj, with c(0) given 
by the solution to v'(c(0)/a(0)) = u'(c(0))a(0). This type of functional equation fre-
quently arises in the study of signaling games. The question of the existence and 
uniqueness of solutions of this type is addressed in Mailath 1987. 
10It may be possible to construct examples in which the direct income effect of an 
increase in g is sufficiently stronger than the substitution effect so that female output 
levels become more concentrated, resulting in a rise in g. 
15 their own society, then differences in the distribution of 
productivities within these societies would generate differ-
ences in their effort decisions. For example, if the produc-
tivity multiplier in society A was greater than that in soci-
ety B, aA > aB, then this would imply that society A's 
matching function was flatter, gA < gB, and females with 
identical ability levels would choose to work less in soci-
ety A than in B. This is because output levels would be 
more disperse in society A than in B; hence the competi-
tion over matches would be more intense in B.
n 
Interpreting the Model 
When females in this model make effort decisions, they 
take into account the effect of those decisions on their 
match, since their consumption will depend on that match. 
Precisely how a female's effort decision affects her match 
depends both on the effort choices of other women and 
on the distribution of wealth among men. Since men make 
no decisions in this model, they play no role other than to 
serve as prizes in the wealth tournament the females are 
engaged in. Any other exogenously given set of prizes 
that are to be awarded to females based on their relative 
rank in the final wealth distribution would serve the same 
purpose. The important property is that there is some prize 
(about which the females care) that is not allocated through 
standard markets, but rather can be obtained only through 
the wealth tournament. While the competition for mates 
has this property, we think there are a number of other 
goods and decisions that have the same property. We will 
return to this topic in the concluding remarks at the end of 
this article. 
The model as presented has the females engaged in 
what is essentially home production; there is no market 
for labor. It is obvious, however, that if there were a com-
petitive labor market which employed the females, the 
productivity function a would simply be the wage func-
tion, with each woman paid a wage equal to her marginal 
product. 
Relating the Model to Other Models 
The model presented above has implications that differ 
from those of a more standard model for a wide range of 
questions. For example, standard models that analyze the 
impact of income taxes treat a proportional tax as a wage 
decrease. In such models, the impact of such a tax is the 
aggregate of the individual agents' responses to the lower 
wage. The main point of the model above, however, is 
that an agent responds differently to a lower wage when 
other agents' wages remain the same than she would if 
those agents' wages are also lowered. When all agents' 
wages are lowered, two things happen. First, people care 
less about whom they match with (unless people respond 
to the lower wages by increasing their effort sufficiently 
to keep their incomes from falling). Second, an individual 
will face a different wealth distribution following the ag-
gregate wage change. Thus there will be a different map-
ping that associates a given wealth level with a particular 
mate. Standard models analyzing tax policies ignore the 
effect that a change in the wealth distribution may have 
on individuals' effort choices. A potentially interesting 
corollary of this is that there may be a component of a tax 
policy normally ignored—the effect the policy has on the 
distribution of income. This aspect of our model might 
be useful in investigating differences in economic perfor-
mance between more egalitarian societies, such as Japan 
or Korea, and less egalitarian ones, such as India or the 
Philippines. 
The example analyzed above and the discussion of the 
effects of tax policies are both illustrations of a more gen-
eral point. When increases in wealth or income lead to 
secondary benefits from increases in rank in a society, in-
dividuals will respond differently to individual-specific 
and aggregate shocks. For problems in which these differ-
ences are significant, the common practice of using micro-
economic data to try to draw inferences about responses 
to aggregate shocks presents difficulties that are usually 
overlooked. The micro data may represent responses to in-
dividual shocks, and those responses may systematically 
diverge from identical shocks that were aggregate (in the 
sense that all agents were subjected to the same shock). 
We discuss this point further in the concluding section. 
Our model suggests that since people are in competi-
tion over their wealth rank, they might respond to the ef-
forts of others to earn more by seeking to earn more them-
selves. Neumark and Postlewaite (1995) examined the ef-
fects of other women's employment decisions on women 
with whom they might be in social competition. Neumark 
and Postlewaite assumed that siblings are likely to be in 
social competition over their relative wealth, perhaps be-
cause they are likely to know a lot about one another's 
economic circumstances. This study found some evidence 
that a woman's employment decisions are positively af-
fected by her sister's decision to become employed. 
1
1
 As was pointed out in footnote 7, m = (c) which here implies that g = 
1 /c'U). 
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Incomplete Information and Signaling 
In the model presented above, an individual's wealth is 
observable. If wealth is not observable (but is still impor-
tant to potential mates), individuals with relatively high 
wealth have an incentive to signal their situation. Build-
ing on this observation, we now develop a model of con-
spicuous consumption reminiscent of Veblen's (1899). In 
our model, however, agents are fully rational with stan-
dard preferences. Agents engage in conspicuous consump-
tion because it is instrumental: in equilibrium, it results in 
wealthier mates and, consequently, higher consumption. 
The underlying logic of the model is that of general sig-
naling models: wealthier agents consume expensive items 
that can be observed in order to signal the agents' greater 
wealth. The inferences to be drawn from such consump-
tion are equilibrium inferences. It is not that poorer people 
cannot buy a pair of Gucci shoes, but rather that they 
choose not to in equilibrium. Richer individuals choose 
the signal because the opportunity cost to them in terms 
of foregone consumption of other types of goods is lower, 
since they are already consuming more of the other goods. 
To illustrate our point as starkly as possible, we will con-
sider a variant of the original model in which individuals 
signal their wealth by destroying a portion of their wealth. 
The Model With Incomplete Information 
Assume now that female output levels cannot be ob-
served, though for simplicity continue to assume that male 
endowments can. Assume also that females can destroy 
some of their output and the amount they destroy can be 
observed. We are interested in equilibria where richer fe-
males destroy more of their output than do poorer females 
in order to signal that they are richer. Note that for rea-
sons similar to those in the previous model, the woman 
who is destroying the least and hence receiving the worst 
match should in fact not be destroying any of her output. 
(Otherwise, lowering the amount destroyed cannot have 
a negative impact on her match quality, but her consump-
tion would increase.) In equilibrium, the woman receiving 
the worst match and destroying nothing is the lowest-
ability woman. 
Since female wealth is unobservable, a male's evalua-
tion of the attractiveness (in terms of contribution to con-
sumption) of potential mates is determined only by ob-
servable characteristics of females: the amount of wealth 
destroyed in conspicuous consumption. Thus the match m 
is a function of the level of output that a female destroys 
d. In this case, female /s problem becomes 
(10) maxw u(a(j)l - d) - v(l) + m(d). 
The main difference between this problem and problem 
(1) is that previously there was a double benefit to wealth 
acquisition: it increased the quality of her match and in-
creased her consumption. Here she derives no direct bene-
fit from the portion of wealth that she allocates to improv-
ing her match quality. If we denote output al by y the 
female's choice variables are y and d, and her objective 
function is 
(11) u(y-d) - v(y/a) + m(d). 
We show in Proposition 2 in the Appendix that in equilib-
rium both y and d are nondecreasing in ability. 
Consider now the male's problem. Males are interested 
in matching with females with high consumption, that is, 
females with high values of y - d. However, by assump-
tion this consumption is not observable during the match-
ing phase. Instead, males must draw inferences about this 
consumption from the level of destruction d. Suppose that 
the level of destruction is a perfect signal about the level 
of ability and thus consumption.
1
2
 Since d is nondecreas-
ing in ability, this requires that d be strictly increasing, 
which in turn requires that m be strictly increasing. Of 
course, m will only be strictly increasing if higher d is a 
signal of higher consumption, y - d, since only then will 
males prefer to match with females with higher levels of 
destruction. Equilibrium matching then implies that the 
female with the median level of conspicuous consumption 
is matched with the median male; that is, m(d(j)) = j. 
A signaling equilibrium can then be described by an 
effort function /: [0,1] —> R+, specifying each female's 
effort choice, and a destruction function d: [0,1] —> R+, 
which gives each female's destroyed output, and a match-
ing function m: M+ —> [0,1] such that for all j e [0,1], 
(12) (l(j),d(j)) maximizes u(a(J)l - d) - v(/) + m(d) 
subject to d e [0,a(j)l\, 
(13) d and al- dart both strictly increasing functions, 
and for all j, 
1
2
 A slightly weaker notion of signaling would only require that the level of de-
struction be a perfect signal of consumption. This would allow those with different abil-
ities to choose the same level of y and d. Such equilibria can be eliminated by using 
standard refinement arguments. 
17 (14) m(d(j))=j. 
A Second Closed-Form Example 
We now present a second example to illustrate a signaling 
equilibrium. In this example we take the output levels of 
the females to be exogenously given by the function y(j) 
= e
Yy, where y > 0. Since their output is exogenous, the 
females no longer are concerned with their effort level in 
their preferences, so their utility function can now be tak-
en to be the same as the males, that is, u(c) + j. Moreover, 
we take u(c) = In c. 
The problem of female j is to choose d so as to solve 
(15) max^ In(y(j) - d) + m(d). 
The first-order condition which characterizes the solution 
to this maximization is given by 
(16) -l/(y(j) - d) + m\d) = 0. 
If d(J) is the equilibrium level of destruction by female 
j, then m(d(j)) = j. Thus, in equilibrium, m\d) -
[d'(d~\d))]~\ so (16) can be written as 
(17) d\d~\d))=y(j)-d. 
However, in order for d(J) to be the equilibrium level of 
destruction of female j, it must be the case that d = d{j) 
solves (17). Substituting d = d(J) into (17) yields 
(18) d\j) = y{j)-d(j). 
Thus the equilibrium destruction function is the unique 
solution to the initial value problem given by (18) and the 
initial value condition, d{0) = 0. (Recall that the female 
destroying the least does not destroy any.) The solution is 
(19) d(j) = (l+yr'M. 
An interesting aspect of the signaling equilibrium is 
that wealthier females destroy a larger fraction of their 
wealth; that is, d(j)/y(j) is increasing in j. This reflects the 
declining marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and the quality of the match as consumption in-




illustrates the idea that, for small y, the distribution of 
wealth is tight, and the competition for mates is intense, 
so a large fraction of wealth is destroyed. Conversely, if 
y is large, the distribution of wealth is diffuse, the com-
petition for mates is not intense, and a small fraction of 
wealth is destroyed. 
Interpreting the Model 
Our simple incomplete information model readily gener-
ates the sort of conspicuous consumption behavior de-
scribed by Veblen (1899). Consistent with Veblen's argu-
ments, the equilibrium of our unobservable wealth model 
exhibits increasing conspicuous consumption as income 
rises. Note that in our example, if the parameter in the fe-
males' income function y increases, the distribution of in-
come shifts up and the equilibrium matching function 
shifts down. That is, when all females are wealthier, more 
wealth must be wasted in order to obtain the same quality 
mate. 
In our model, no female's wealth is observable. An in-
teresting extension of the logic of the example would in-
clude the possibility that some individuals' wealth levels 
are known to others while other individuals' wealth levels 
are not known. It is clear that no individual whose wealth 
is known has any incentive to engage in conspicuous con-
sumption. The sole reason for an individual to conspic-
uously consume is to alter others' perceptions about that 
individual's wealth. The cost of conspicuous consumption 
is independent of what others know, but the benefit of 
such consumption is limited by their initial uncertainty. 
Thus an implication of a model with differentially known 
wealth levels would be that the more certainly known an 
individual's wealth is, the less that individual will conspic-
uously consume, ceteris paribus. In a multiperiod model 
in which an individual's wealth is learned by others over 
time, one would then see the newly rich more likely to 
engage in conspicuous consumption than people with old 
money. 
In comparing our two models, it is ambiguous whether 
individuals work harder in the observable or unobservable 
wealth models because there are two opposing forces. In 
the observable wealth model, an increase in a person's 
wealth increases both consumption and the quality of her 
match. In the unobservable wealth model, a person can 
use wealth for one or the other of these purposes but not 
both. So there is a sense in which an additional unit of 
wealth may be more valuable in the observable wealth 
^Differentiating d(j)/y(j) with respect to yyields (1+y)
 2[(1 +j+yj)e
1 yj - 1], This 
expression is negative since 1 +j + yj < e^. [A standard fact about In is that ln(l+jc) 
<x] 
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model if one's marginal utility of consumption is held 
fixed. However, if an individual's wealth is held fixed, her 
marginal utility will generally be lower in the unobserv-
able wealth model since she does not enjoy all the direct 
consumption benefits that this wealth would imply in the 
other model. A higher marginal utility of consumption 
would encourage her to work harder.
1
4 
Relating the Model to Other Models 
The main point of this model is that because people care 
about whom they are matched with, they will compete to 
appear to be desirable matches. Wealth makes one more 
desirable, and when wealth is incompletely known by oth-
ers, there is an incentive by the relatively wealthy to make 
that fact known. In our model, goods that might serve as 
signals of wealth (because, for example, they are known 
to be expensive, such as Rolex watches, Gucci shoes, and 
BMWs) will have qualitatively different demand structures 
than in standard models. For example, if prices are too 
low, the good may not support an equilibrium in which 
the wealthy can use it as a signal: the (relatively) poor 
may be willing to buy the good and thus destroy its sig-
naling value. 
A second important difference between our model and 
other models is suggested by the remarks in the previous 
section about new wealth versus old wealth. We pointed 
out how incomplete information about others' economic 
characteristics could be a factor in the demand for goods 
of a certain type. The logic of the model, then, suggests 
how changes in the information structure can influence 
economic decisions such as effort and spending choices in 
ways that differ from standard models. Models of the sort 
analyzed in this section suggest how changes in the envi-
ronment that affect the informational structure (increased 
geographic mobility, for example) might affect economic 
decisions in ways that standard models cannot capture. 
Concluding Comments 
The models presented above induce a concern for relative 
rank. This concern arises because there are utility-relevant 
decisions—in these models, matching decisions—that are 
affected by one's relative position in the wealth distribu-
tion. We want to make several points regarding the man-
ner in which an individual's utility is affected by relative 
position. 
As noted in footnote 4, if an individual's decision 
problem were described in sufficiently rich detail, relative 
wealth wouldn't matter: an individual's income and the 
prices of all utility-relevant objects and decisions would 
completely determine utility. The concern for relative 
wealth in our models arises because of the existence of a 
utility-relevant decision which (in our model) is not medi-
ated by prices—specifically, the matching decision. This 
raises the question of whether there is a simple reinterpre-
tation of the equilibrium in which an implicit price can be 
put on the scarce objects. In such a reinterpretation, every 
man can be associated with a wealth level that is neces-
sary to assure matching with him. One could then think of 
this as the price function women face for mates. But this 
is not quite correct. Unlike the situation in which women 
work to buy some inelastically supplied good of varying 
quality like land, women in our models don't really pay 
for mates. A woman who generates the highest wealth in 
the first period does match with the wealthiest man, but 
she also continues to consume the wealth she accumu-
lated. To make the land example analogous to our models 
we should have the land simply given away, with the best 
given to the wealthiest, and so on. The allocation of desir-
able goods or decisions in accordance with economic per-
formance can substantially differ from the allocation of 
those goods through normal markets. In particular, we 
should note that when the desirable goods or decisions are 
allocated as prizes rather than sold, the standard welfare 
theorems regarding the Pareto optimality of the outcomes 
no longer apply. 
We chose the present models rather than alternative 
models in which all goods and decisions are mediated 
through markets for reasons of descriptive accuracy: it 
seems obvious to us that there are myriads of goods and 
decisions about which people care (sometimes passion-
ately) that (1) individuals don't purchase through standard 
markets and (2) wealthier individuals are better at obtain-
ing than the less wealthy. Country club memberships, 
charity board invitations, university trusteeships, invita-
tions to chic parties, and assigned seats in churches and 
synagogues come easily to mind as examples. To be sure, 
these decisions are often accompanied by money changing 
hands, but not in the form of a simple purchase of a good 
or service. Whenever an increase in an individual's po-
sition in the wealth distribution by itself increases the like-
lihood of obtaining desirable outcomes, optimal individual 
behavior will exhibit some of the qualitative features ex-
hibited in the models analyzed above. We should em-
14Of course, the lowest-productivity female is working the same amount in the two 
economies. 
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causes women to adjust their decisions from what the de-
cisions would otherwise have been is to illustrate the more 
general effect of utility-relevant decisions that are not me-
diated by markets. There are presumably many important 
details of real-world matching that we have abstracted 
from. We think, however, that while this may not be a 
particularly compelling model of matching, it clearly il-
lustrates our general point. 
We pointed out above the difference between an in-
dividual's response to an individual-specific shock and an 
aggregate shock. In general, one should expect a differ-
ence. In an environment in which there are many agents, 
an individual-specific shock should have no effect on 
prices, while an aggregate shock generally will. Hence an 
aggregate shock will affect prices, prompting a response 
different from that induced by an individual-specific shock. 
Our model generates different responses to individual and 
aggregate shocks for similar reasons. Any shock will have 
a primary effect on an individual, resulting in a change in 
effort expended. If the shock is an aggregate shock, all 
individuals will adjust, and as a result, the mapping that 
associates a given wealth level with a particular mate will 
change. The change in this mapping is analogous to the 
price change one expects in a general equilibrium model 
that is subjected to an aggregate shock. We point to this 
difference in response to individual and aggregate shocks 
in our model because, while economists are accustomed 
to thinking about general equilibrium price effects that 
might accompany an aggregate shock, it would be easy to 
overlook the general equilibrium effects on goods or de-
cisions that are not mediated by standard economic mar-
kets, but are affected by relative wealth position. 
Appendix 
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 
Here we develop the proofs for the two propositions discussed 
in the preceding paper. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
PROPOSITION 1. In the complete information model, output, c(j) 
= a(j)Kj), is increasing in j. 
Proof. Consider two arbitrary female agents j and /, where / > 
j, and suppose (en route to a contradiction) that the optimal out-
put levels of the female good are c and c\ respectively, with c 
> c. Then it must be the case that female j weakly prefers 
(c,m(c)) (an output of c and matching with m(c)) to (c,m(c)); 
that is, 
(Al) u(c) + m(c) - v(c/a(j)) 
- [iu(c') + m(c) - v(c'/a(j))] > 0. 
Similarly, female f weakly prefers (c',ra(c')) to (<c,m(c))\ that is, 
(A2) u(c') + m(c) - v(c'/a(f)) 
- [u(c) + m{c) - v(c/a(f))] > 0. 
Adding (Al) to (A2) yields 
(A3) v(c/a(f)) - v(c'/a(f)) ~ Mc/a(j)) - v(c'la(j))} > 0. 
But the convexity of v implies that v(da) - v(cla) is decreasing 
in a when c > c, a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
PROPOSITION 2. In the incomplete information model, both the 
equilibrium output and destruction levels are nondecreasing in 
ability. 
Proof Let (yd) denote an optimal choice for female j and 
(y,d
f) an optimal choice for /, and suppose that j < f. Then 
(with a = a(j) and a' = a(J')), 
(A4) u(y-d) - v(y/a) + m(d) > u{y-d
f) - v(y/a) + m(d') 
and 
(A5) u(y-d') - v(y/a) + m(d') > u(y-d) - v(y/a) + m(d). 
Adding and canceling yield 
(A6) v(y/a) - v(y/a ) > v(y/a) - v(y/a). 
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Then, since a < a, we have that y < y. (If not, convexity of v 
implies that v(y/a) - v(y'/a) is decreasing in a.) If cf > y, we 
have that d < y < d', and both y and d are nondecreasing. So 
suppose d' < y. In this case, female j can destroy the same 
amount as / while still producing >>. Then, 
(A7) u(y-d) - v{y/a) + m(d) > u(y-d') - v(y/a) + m{d')\ 
that is, 
(A8) u(y-d) - u{y-d') > m(d') - m{d). 
Moreover, since d<y< y, 
(A9) u(y-d') - v(y'/a) + m(d') > u(y'-d) - v(yla) + m(d)\ 
that is, 
(A 10) m(d') - m(d) > u(y-d) - u{y-d') 
so that 
(All) u(y-d) - u(y-d') > u{y-d) - u(y'-d'). 
The concavity of u together with v < y' then implies that d < cf. 
Q.E.D. 
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